February 10, 2003

Pawing Through Foreign Affairs Fouad

Pawing Through Foreign Affairs

Fouad Ajami's optimistic assessment of the possibilities for a post-Saddam Iraq rightly got a fair amount of blogospheric attention, but I only just now happened upon this stimulating essay by Michael Scott Doran, from the same issue of Foreign Affairs.

"Palestine, Iraq, and U.S. Strategy" is an extremely clear and well-argued analysis of the function of "Palestine-as-symbol" vs. "Palestine-as-place" in Middle Eastern politics, addressing the contention that a US-brokered "solution" of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might serve as an effective means of appeasing bin Ladenite Islamists:

for Arab states the Palestinian issue is a game of four-dimensional chess. When an Arab leader announces a policy toward the issue, he makes a move directed simultaneously at critics at home, Arab rivals abroad, the United States, and the Palestinians and Israelis themselves -- with the last being by far the least important audience. The sad fact is that with the possible exception of Jordan, alleviating the suffering of the Palestinian people is not a primary policy objective of any Middle Eastern state. For Washington to mistake symbol for substance and tie itself into knots trying to resolve the Palestinian problem before tackling other matters would thus be a sucker's move, providing its enemies with even greater incentives to incite violence there while avoiding other arenas where it has greater freedom of action and chances for success.

For Doran, while America's "near enemies" (here he neatly appropriates the Islamists own terminology) are indeed those presenting immediate threats, such as al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, yet "factors that contribute to the region's popular anger and despair constitute 'far enemies' and must eventually be dealt with just as firmly and effectively if the American-sponsored order is to last and thrive over the longer term."

The plan?

The first order of business for the United States must... be to demonstrate forcefully that challenges to its authority in the region will be defeated. Its near enemies can be met in no other way, since their opposition to the present order is deep-rooted and total. Unless America is prepared to abandon its position and pull back from the region, as the British did three and a half decades ago, it must carry its struggle against al Qaeda and Saddam to the finish, putting an end to all doubt regarding its resolve. Thwarting Saddam's ambitions and continuing to root out bin Laden's henchmen and associates, moreover, will do more than take care of immediate menaces. It will also serve to sober up onlookers with oppositionist ambitions of their own, making them recalculate the odds of defying a power that has demonstrated its intention to remain a permanent and dynamic regional player.

Once the near enemies have been bested, however, the moment will arrive to launch a vigorous and sustained effort to address the far enemies, as the crucial second stage in strengthening the Pax Americana. Unless the suppression of Saddam is seen to lead to a better life for the Iraqi population, and unless American strength and resolve is used on behalf of all the region's people, not simply the governments of American allies, then a new set of near enemies will certainly arise and have to be dealt with in their turn. In the long run, the strength and passion of Palestine-as-symbol will be sapped only by the creation of a new, more persuasive historical narrative that allows the people of the Middle East to see the United States, and the West more generally, as their partner in the quest for a better life.


Sounds good. How likely is it that the far enemies will in fact be pursued with sufficiently unflagging vigor that such a "new narrative" will actually emerge? I suppose that depends upon how much faith you have in the resolution and over-arching vision of our leaders as well as in the potential goodwill of our current adversaries. I hate to say it, but for me the answer to the latter question is: not much. Still, it's worth a shot (so to speak...) And fostering something approaching modern, secular democracy in a liberated Iraq (which is certainly conceivable, as Ajami argues, and as the example of Anglo-American protected "Kurdistan" bears out) would be a huge step in the right direction, new "narrative" or not; indeed failing to do so (or at least to make credible efforts to that end) would amount to a resounding defeat, notwithstanding the toppling of Saddam.

Moving right along

"Any fallout of war," Ajami writes, "is certain to be dwarfed by the terrible consequences of America's walking right up to the edge of war and then stepping back, letting the Iraqi dictator work the terms of yet another reprieve." It's hard to argue with that: stepping back at this stage would be a terrible mistake, undermining US (and, less importantly, UN) credibility and inviting further defiance. Yet that is precisely what Richard Betts proposes in his consideration of what could happen "if Saddam strikes back." Does Saddam have agents in the United States poised to unleash small pox, anthrax, vx, or ricin when given the order? And should this possibility "deter" the US from pursuing the goal of desposing Saddam? Have our leaders taken this possible threat seriously enough? Good questions.

It seems to me that, even supposing a worst-case scenario (well organized, well-supplied, well-hidden Iraqi terrorists who are capable of launching these operations without screwing up), such a danger will only increase exponentially with delay. Betts dismisses this line of thinking as the unwarranted conflation of two entirely separate questions (what Saddam will do if attacked vs. what he would do if left alone) but isn't that begging the question? Leaving him alone isn't an option. Can there be many who share Betts's confidence that "smart" sanctions and beefed up inspections have much chance of preventing the eventual success of Iraq's nuclear program or improved WMD delivery systems? He says this approach is a "less bad" alternative to war, but it's hard to see how.

Posted by Dr. Frank at February 10, 2003 10:04 AM | TrackBack