Jim Henley provides a good, thoughtful summation of where the war stands as he sees it, focusing on the nexus between psychology, politics and tactics.
I think he's probably right about this: the Iraqi regime doesn't realize it's doomed. I don't think it's at all implausible that their actions are guided, in part, by a desire to conserve as much of their forces as possible for an imagined post-war period. They still think they can ride it out, wait till the invasion becomes politically untenable for the invaders, emerge when it's all over and declare "victory" based on the fact that they're still walking around in the rubble. That has worked for them every time so far. The coalition's current self-imposed, restrictive rules of engagement are a sign of strength and confidence, but I'm sure they contribute to the impression that the US is no more serious than they were the last time about seeing this through to the end. Could such restraint also, paradoxically, be sending a similar message to the justifiably skeptical Iraqi people who, we are assured, are poised to rise up in revolt once they are convinced of US resolve? Does the still-uncertain reputed Basra uprising indicate that the message has got through despite the "kinder, gentler war"? And if not, how much extra damage is the US willing to absorb in the interests of postwar goodwill before they decide to revise the strategy? Paradoxes abound.
The US has based this novel policy on a combination of genuine morality, public relations, and plausible tactical praxis; the Saddamites have responded, unsurprisingly, with a strategy based on immorality, public relations, and plausible tactical praxis. Strange war.
UPDATE: Bill Quick comments, expressing skepticism about the validity of the "poisoning the well of goodwill" meme. But it hasn't been dreamed up out of thin air. It's clearly based on deliberate, manifest US strategy; the Bush administration is firmly behind it (in both senses), so far, as Bill points out. There are a lot of reasons I can think of-- and doubtless some that I can't fathom-- for the strategy. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, there's something to be said, practically as well as morally, for winning with minimal damage to infrastructure, to the degree it's possible (though there's also a great deal to be said, again practically as well as morally, for using every means to win as quickly and decisively as possible.) And to the extent that public relations play a role, the Iraqis themselves are plainly not the only, nor even, perhaps, the most important, audience. At any rate, it's hard to imagine these rules of engagement surviving too many more cases of summary executions of American POWs and the like.
Posted by Dr. Frank at March 26, 2003 07:33 AM | TrackBack