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More on Glorious Irrelevance Here's

More on Glorious Irrelevance

Here's a long and detailed essay (via Moira Breen) from the always provocative Robert Kagan, on the reasons for the differences between European and American "strategic culture." It's the least anti-European argument in favor of American power that I've read in a long time. It also contains the most convincing (and surprisingly serious) application I've seen so far of Robert Cooper's much-maligned and -trumpeted analytical scheme of "post-modern" vs. "modern states." 

For Kagan, the divergence begins, but does not end, with a simple fact about the reality of power: those incapable of practicing machtpolitik tend to be less enthusiastic about power than those who have that capability. Europe's past disastrous experiences with power politics, coupled with this contemporary strategic reality, result in an almost inevitable spiritual disjunction between the "hyperpuissant" hegemon and the now powerless "ancient peoples."  

Yet far from condemning new Europe's aspirations and pretensions to embody a "Kantian paradise" of perpetual peace, Kagan proclaims new Europe to be a "blessed miracle."

For Europeans, it is the realization of a long and improbable dream: a continent free from nationalist strife and blood feuds, from military competition and arms races. War between the major European powers is almost unimaginable. After centuries of misery, not only for Europeans but also for those pulled into their conflicts - as Americans were twice in the past century - the new Europe really has emerged as a paradise. It is something to be cherished and guarded, not least by Americans, who have shed blood on Europe's soil and would shed more should the new Europe ever fail.

The US has made this miracle possible through a deliberate policy of rendering Europe strategically irrelevant and thus, in a sense, spiritually "free."

The United States... solved the Kantian paradox for the Europeans. Kant had argued that the only solution to the immoral horrors of the Hobbesian world was the creation of a world government. But he also feared that the "state of universal peace" made possible by world government would be an even greater threat to human freedom than the Hobbesian international order, inasmuch as such a government, with its monopoly of power, would become "the most horrible despotism." How nations could achieve perpetual peace without destroying human freedom was a problem Kant could not solve. But for Europe the problem was solved by the United States. By providing security from outside, the United States has rendered it unnecessary for Europe's supranational government to provide it. Europeans did not need power to achieve peace and they do not need power to preserve it...

What this means is that although the United States has played the critical role in bringing Europe into this Kantian paradise, and still plays a key role in making that paradise possible, it cannot enter this paradise itself. It mans the walls but cannot walk through the gate. The United States, with all its vast power, remains stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams and the ayatollahs, the Kim Jong Ils and the Jiang Zemins, leaving the happy benefits to others.

I believe there are those who do, in fact, see the EU as a "horrible despotism," but that's by the way. Some commentators maintain that the key to European psychology on defense policy is that they no longer believe they have external enemies that they need to be protected from. (Among blogospherians, Steven Chapman has made this case persuasively in a couple of recent posts.) Is it true? The maddening fact about our current situation is that internal and external threats are increasingly difficult to distinguish-- al Qaeda cells in European cities are an internal law enforcement problem as well as a military threat. (If I still lived in London, I'd still be worried about Islamist terrorism, I can tell you that). But leaving that aside, do Europeans really look upon the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iraq with such equanimity? Even if Saddam's targeting priorities leave Europe well down the list, don't they have as much to fear as anyone from the horrors that would be brought to bear once a Saddam bomb enters the equation? Wouldn't it be in their interest to support a pre-emptive "regime change," even if only because they know that the inevitable "cowboy" response to a future Iraqi nuclear attack on anyone would be overwhelming and unimaginably destructive? Do they imagine that they can exempt themselves from being affected by such a conflict? Even if they truly believe the conflict would disappear if only the Americans could be persuaded to "convert" to postmodernism and neglect their own defenses, can they possibly imagine that such a scenario is even remotely possible? Americans may be able to appreciate Europe's glorious irrelevance, but not enough to join in, especially when under threat of attack.  

Nevertheless, Europe's worries about the "fall-out" from American foreign policy are understandable, both as a spiritual as well as a practical matter. Here's how Kagan puts the practical side of it:

American policymakers find it hard to believe, but leading officials and politicians in Europe worry more about how the United States might handle or mishandle the problem of Iraq - by undertaking unilateral and extralegal military action - than they worry about Iraq itself and Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.

It is a bit hard to believe, but they do have a point: the Bush administration's dithering and apparent confusion don't inspire confidence that they know what they're doing (pious dreams of "rope-a-dope" notwithstanding.) European statesmen are being asked to endorse in advance what some might see as a rather dubious proposition: that the US will start a war in Iraq and finish it this time, and that there is a solid plan in place by which to accomplish this. Judging from recent reports, not even the administration appears to believe that. The President, in the midst of calling for a tough stance on Iraq, recently assured our European allies that if there is such a plan, it's not "on his desk." I'm sure someone, somewhere, knows what's going on. But this idea of a tough stance with no plan is hardly encouraging. Surely even Bush is capable of producing a higher grade of snake oil than that.   

The clock is ticking, however. Where mortal danger is concerned, I have even less confidence in European-style conflict resolution and appeasement than I do in the tough-talking President's empty desk top. A Guardian editorial recently suggested that Bush guarantee that there would be no action against Iraq unless Saddam strikes first. In other words: (a) say goodbye to Tel Aviv, quickly followed by (b) say goodbye to the rest of the middle east, and God only knows what else. Of course the chances of any American president issuing such a guarantee are precisely zero, which the European governments (if not the Guardian) must surely realize, gloriously irrelevant calls for sophistication notwithstanding. There will be a new war against Iraq, one way or another, sooner or later. Postponing it till the threat is infinitely greater serves the interests of no one, not even the Europeans. Nor even the Iraqis.

Posted by Dr. Frank at May 26, 2002 08:03 PM | TrackBack