December 05, 2002

Let's Do More about Doing

Let's Do More about Doing More to Do More

Readers of this blog know that I've been pretty skeptical about the Bush administration's resolve when it comes to living up to its own tough rhetoric on Iraq. It's not so much that I doubt Bush's sincerity. It's more a matter of the theory and praxis not matching up. Or so it seems.

You have to look good and hard to find someone who denies that a Saddam-less world would be a better place. They're out there, but they're on the fringe of the fringe's fringe. And virtually no one outside of crackpot circles seriously doubts that Saddam poses a threat to the US and US interests as well as to the rest of the world. Hardly anyone truly believes that the danger can be dispensed with through negotiation or appeasement without an eventual military confrontation. (Even among the crackpots, the danger tends to be acknowledged: the exquisitely loopy objection to removing Saddam from power is not that it wouldn't be desirable, but rather that the "tainted" US has no legitimate standing in the matter.) The Bush position on this universally-acknowledged danger has been very clear: it is serious, it is imminent, and it must be met without delay. Now it's possible to quibble about the "imminent" part; or rather, to wonder just how imminent is imminent. But given the administration's unequivocal position that imminent means "right now" or "yesterday" it's impossible to avoid the question: what's the delay? They seem to be stalling. Why?

You know the drill. Some say it's not stalling at all, and that everything's going according to plan. This "rope-a-dope" theory has been looking threadbare for quite some time. So has the one that goes "we need time to prepare"-- if we need over a year to organize our forces in order to meet a serious immediate threat, we're in far more trouble than anybody realizes. (At any rate, we probably should be about ready now. There's nothing wrong with the US military's capabilities; it's the decision to set it in motion that is, apparently, lacking.) More plausible, perhaps, is the idea that, behind the scenes, the still-lingering grand old men of a previous foreign policy establishment, who favor the status quo in the Middle East, have been partially successful in putting the brakes on GWB's "reckless adventurism." (e.g., Scowcroft, GHWB, Eagleburger, Baker, perhaps Kissinger and Powell, anyone who has ever been an ambassador to Saudi Arabia-- the only "anti-war movement" that matters. And ultimately doomed to failure like the other one. The status quo is going to break apart whether we elect to try to influence the new order or not.) Or perhaps it's exactly as it looks: the Bush administration is just making it up as they go along; they can't settle on a plan, and keep sending out mixed signals in order to preserve the option of backtracking, and really aren't in control of the situation. We had all better hope that's not the case. Even if you like to think of yourself as "anti-war," even if you'd prefer a less aggressive foreign policy posture, even if you're a dyed-in-the-wool multi-lateralist anti-interventionist pacifist person of conscience who wishes there was some way that Berkeley could join the EU, you've got to admit: an ineffective hawk is far worse than an ineffective dove.

Those trying to discern an orderly pattern amid the apparent policy chaos have set their hopes on the Dec. 8th UNSC deadline as the date when all will be revealed, and the dogs of war let slip. Michael Kelly thinks so, combing through Bush's statements and offering helpful tips like this: "note the word 'any.' It means: any -- at all." Yeah, that's what it means. But saying isn't the same as doing. (John Podhoretz didn't even bother to parse out the words; he declares that "the biggest hawk of all is in the oval office" on the basis of nothing more than his own intuition. Maybe that's as good a basis as any, at that. Who knows?)

Here's how it's supposed to go: Iraq files its report saying that they have no WMDs; the US produces evidence to the contrary, plus indisputable instances where Iraq has attempted to hinder the inspections and has failed to cooperate fully with the resolution; the UN says that that's not enough to qualify as a "material breach" of the resolution and refuses to authorize military force; the US says "sorry guys, but we already launched our invasion a couple of hours ago, just like we said we would. Enjoy."

I'm sorry, but I still can't for the life of me imagine it happening like that. We'll know soon enough.

Anyway, Kelly's textual analysis doesn't extend to stuff like this:

The Bush administration is set to declare Iraq in violation of the U.N. resolution requiring Baghdad to give up weapons of mass destruction, The Washington Times has learned.

"It is going to be 'material breach,' not as a casus belli [cause for war] but as a basis to begin hammering Unmovic to do more," said an administration official familiar with the internal debate.


Oops. A "material breach" turns out not to be a casus belli after all.

Over the last couple of years I've noticed something: when people in this administration want to take a position without taking a position, they always fall back on telling someone to "do more." Here, for example. Or here:

MR. FLEISCHER: In fact, our assessment, as you well know, is that Saudi Arabia is a good partner in the war on terrorism, and they are a good partner who can do more. And we continue to work with them, so we can do more together.

Yes, do let's do more. Together. Group hug.

On the other hand, Steven Den Beste is able to discern method in the apparent madness, order in the seeming chaos; he does it so brilliantly that he has me half-convinced. December 8th is three days away. Who knows what will happen?

I'm not saying the administration isn't doing all it can to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.

But maybe they could do more.

Posted by Dr. Frank at December 5, 2002 08:49 AM | TrackBack