Why there is no organized liberal opposition to the war
This New York Times magazine article about soul-searching among and inside American liberal hawks is worth a look. I guess I'd say I'm one, though I haven't felt at all "conflicted" about Iraq. (And I daresay many would want to kick me out of the liberal club-- which is fine: I don't much like clubs anyway.) I wish I felt more confident in the administration's will to act, is all.
That effecting regime change in Iraq is consonant with true liberal principles is difficult to deny. And to oppose it just because the guy in charge happens to belong to a party other than yours is the height of idiocy. That may be a bit of a caricature of "principled liberal opposition," but I doubt it's far wrong. Liberal intellectuals who equivocate about Iraq tend to give the impression of desperation, of grasping, for unacknowledged personal reasons, for a pretext (any pretext) upon which to oppose the president. This article captures this rather well:
On the eve of what looks like the next American war, the Bosnia consensus has fallen apart. The argument that has broken out among these liberal hawks over Iraq is as fierce in its way as anything since Vietnam. This time the argument is taking place not just between people but within them, where the dilemmas and conflicts are all the more tormenting. What makes the agony over Iraq particularly intense is the new role of conservatives. Members of the Bush administration who had nothing but contempt for human rights talk until the day before yesterday have grabbed the banner of democracy and are waving it on behalf of the long-suffering Iraqi people. For liberal hawks, this is painful to watch....Posted by Dr. Frank at December 9, 2002 07:31 AM | TrackBackOne chilly evening in late November, a panel discussion on Iraq was convened at New York University. The participants were liberal intellectuals, and one by one they framed reasonable arguments against a war in Iraq: inspections need time to work; the Bush doctrine has a dangerous agenda; the history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East is not encouraging. The audience of 150 New Yorkers seemed persuaded.
Then the last panelist spoke. He was an Iraqi dissident named Kanan Makiya, and he said, ''I'm afraid I'm going to strike a discordant note.'' He pointed out that Iraqis, who will pay the highest price in the event of an invasion, ''overwhelmingly want this war.'' He outlined a vision of postwar Iraq as a secular democracy with equal rights for all of its citizens. This vision would be new to the Arab world. ''It can be encouraged, or it can be crushed just like that. But think about what you're doing if you crush it.'' Makiya's voice rose as he came to an end. ''I rest my moral case on the following: if there's a sliver of a chance of it happening, a 5 to 10 percent chance, you have a moral obligation, I say, to do it.''
The effect was electrifying. The room, which just minutes earlier had settled into a sober and comfortable rejection of war, exploded in applause. The other panelists looked startled, and their reasonable arguments suddenly lay deflated on the table before them.
Michael Walzer, who was on the panel, smiled wanly. ''It's very hard to respond,'' he said.
It was hard, I thought, because Makiya had spoken the language beloved by liberal hawks. He had met their hope of avoiding a war with an even greater hope. He had given the people in the room an image of their own ideals.